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The Exercise of Administrative Discretion
Under the Immigration Laws
MAURICE A. ROBERTS*
In terms of human misery, the potential impact of our immigra-
tion laws can hardly be overstated. With minor exceptions, the
immigration laws operate directly and exclusively upon human be-
ings, flesh and blood, men, women and children, whose hopes for
future happiness in a realistic sense frequently depend on their
ability to enter, or remain in, this land of freedom and opportunity.
When an alien has been in the United States for many years and
has established roots, his deportation may tear him from his home
and family and deprive him "of all that makes life worth living."'-
To the United States citizen or legally resident alien seeking re-
union with his alien wife or children, the denial of the immigrant
visas needed to bring them here presents the cruel option of choos-
ing between his country and his loved ones.
The statutes themselves contain a built-in potential for hardship
which is to some extent unavoidable. In carving out the general
classes of aliens eligible to be admitted and to remain here, the
laws obviously exclude all others who do not fit into the defined
* Editor, Interpreter Releases, American Council for Nationalities Serv-
ice. Juris Doctor, Rutgers University Law School, 1932. Former Chairman,
Board of Immigration Appeals, United States Department of Justice.
1. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
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classes, with harsh results in marginal and borderline cases. The
statutory provisions are highly technical and exceedingly complex,
so that even the officials charged with their enforcement sometimes
make mistakes and erroneously admit inadmissible aliens, who have
established roots here by the time the error is later discovered.
2
The chances of hardship are aggravated by the fact that there is
no realistic time limit on the power of the Immigration and Natura-
lization Service (hereinafter referred to as the Service) to start de-
portation proceedings against an alien alleged to be here unlaw-
fully.3 In practical effect, the Service is free to proceed no matter
how many years have elapsed since the alien was admitted to this
country, or since the events occurred which render him deport-
able.4
To afford some opportunity for relief from the hardships that
inevitably result from the application of laws thus cast in inflexible
terms, Congress has through the years provided an ever-increasing
array of administrative remedies. Some waive specified grounds
of inadmissibility. Others suspend deportation and provide for the
creation of a record of lawful admission for permanent residence
2. See, e.g., Santiago v. INS, No. 73-2497 (9th Cir. Mar. 4, 1975). The
Court of Appeals held that the Immigration Service is estopped from
bringing deportation proceedings against innocent aliens with immigrant
visas thus erroneously admitted, where the sole ground for deportation is
technical inadmissibility at the time of entry.
3. There are some time limits. Thus, for example, in the case of an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence who is thereafter convicted
of a crime involving moral turpitude and sentenced to prison for a year
or more, deportation is prescribed only if the crime is "committed within
five years after entry." Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 [herein-
after cited as I. & N. Act], § 241(a) (4), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (4) (1970).
However, an alien who incurs deportability under this provision or others
remains liable to the initiation of deportation proceedings no matter how
many years have elapsed since he committed the deportable offense.
Time limitations under prior immigration laws were repealed in 1952 with
the enactment of the 1952 Act. The retroactive application of the new pro-
visions, which have the effect of rendering deportable aliens who had previ-
ously achieved nondeportability under the prior law's statute of limitations,
has been sustained. Lehmann v. Carson, 353 U.S. 685 (1957). Numerous
bills have since been introduced to prescribe a statute of limitations, but
thus far none have been enacted.
4. See, e.g., Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955), involving an alien
who came to the United States as an eight-month-old baby in 1910 and
whose deportation order was based on a 1938 marijuana conviction. The
deportation proceedings are still pending.
for aliens here illegally or otherwise without that status. The vari-
ous forms of relief, which will be discussed in greater detail below,
have certain common features; each form of relief has specific
statutory eligibility requirements, and once statutory eligibility is
established, the award of relief is still committed to agency discre-
tion. "Suspension of deportation is a matter of discretion and of
administrative grace, not mere eligibility; discretion must be exer-
cised even though statutory prerequisites have been met."
Quite apart from such typical examples of the exercise of ad-
ministrative discretion as a formal part of the adjudicatory process,
there are other aspects of immigration law enforcement in which
the exercise of discretion plays a crucial role. In recent years, the
number of aliens illegally in the United States has risen sharply.
In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, the Service apprehended
a record 788,000 deportable aliens and it has estimated that the total
number of illegal aliens "is possibly as great as 10 or 12 million."10
While the accuracy of these high estimates has been questioned, 7
it is clear that the Service has identified many more aliens here
unlawfully than it has proceeded against. In determining which
illegal aliens should be singled out for the initiation of deportation
proceedings and which should be permitted to remain unmolested,
for how long they should be permitted to remain and under what
conditions, the Service exercises what is tantamount to prosecu-
torial discretion.
Some degree of discretion is also subjectively involved in adjudi-
cating the various types of applications for benefits under the im-
migration laws, in which the supporting evidence submitted by the
applicant is appraised and fact findings are made. Typical is the
visa petition, in which a United States citizen or permanent resident
alien seeks to obtain expedited issuance of an immigrant visa to
a closely related alien on the basis of exemption from normal nu-
merical limitations8 or statutory preference within the numerical
limitations. 9 Theoretically, the evidence submitted to establish
the existence or bona fides of the claimed relationship is weighed
objectively and dispassionately and appropriate fact findings are
made on the basis of the persuasiveness of the evidence. Realistic-
5. United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72, 77
(1957).
6. 1974 INS Am. REP. ii.
7. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REc. 6222 (daily ed. June 26, 1975) (remarks of
Representative Badillo).
8. I. & N. Act § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1970).
9. Id. § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a).
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ally, and especially where the proofs are conflicting, the appraisal
of the evidence frequently involves a value judgment, in which the
subjective attitudes of the adjudicator can often play a decisive
part. While this fact finding process is not the exercise of discre-
tion in the traditional sense, to the degree that it brings into play
the adjudicator's subjective notions, it has much in common with
the application of discretion qua discretion.
Regardless of the type of discretion involved, the fact remains
that it is exercised by impressionable and fallible human beings
at all levels of the administrative hierarchy. While the Act com-
mits enforcement responsibility to the Attorney General ° and,
upon his delegation, to the Commissioner of Immigration and Na-
turalization," in practice decision making has been delegated to
and is exercised by a host of lesser officials. The Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals (hereinafter referred to as the Board), a five-member
nonstatutory body appointed by and responsible to the Attorney
General, acts for him in reviewing specified types of Service deter-
minations.' 2 The Commissioner, pursuant to authority conferred
by regulation, 3 has redelegated his authority to various officials
in the Service's central office and field offices: Associate Commis-
sioners and their deputies; Assistant Commissioners; General Coun-
sel; Regional Commissioners; District Directors; Officers in Charge;
Immigration Officers; Special Inquiry Officers;' 4 and Chief Pa-
trol Inspectors.' 5 In actual practice, most of the Service's deci-
sions, which go out over the facsimile signatures of the various Dis-
trict Directors, are not made by the District Directors themselves,
but are made in their name by adjudicators at various levels, who
are not required to be lawyers or otherwise formally trained in the
appraisal of evidence.
In the absence of carefully considered and clearly articulated
10. Id. § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
11. Id. § 103(b), 8 U.S.C § 1103(b).
12. 8 C.F.R. pt. 3 (1975).
13. 8 C.F.R. pt. 2 (1975).
14. Special Inquiry Officers are statutory officials. I. & N. Act § 101(b)
(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (4) (1970). They have the authority to conduct ex-
clusion and deportation proceedings. Id. §§ 236(a), 242(b), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226
(a), 1252(b) (1970). They are also referred to as Immigration Judges. 8
C.F.R. § 1.1(1) (1975).
15. 8 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1975).
standards for the exercise of the various types of discretionary
powers, the resulting decisions must necessarily vary with the per-
sonal attitudes and biases of the individual decision makers. Ad-
judicators with hard-nosed outlooks are likely to be more conserva-
tive in their evidentiary appraisals and in their dispensation of dis-
cretionary bounties than their counterparts with more permissive
philosophies. It must be recognized as a fact of life that Service
officers and Board members are no more immune than other per-
sons to the influences that result in individual bias and predilec-
tion. To set up as a standard that a case must be "meritorious"
before discretion is favorably exercised in behalf of an eligible ap-
plicant is therefore illusory. Too many subjective elements go into
the making of such a value judgment.
The importance of achieving a reasonably sound exercise of dis-
cretion at the administrative level is underscored by the fact that,
in a realistic sense, there is no other place to turn. Attempts at
private legislation are becoming increasingly unproductive 0 and
the courts have repeatedly stated that, in reviewing the exercise
of administrative discretion, they will not substitute their judgment
for that of the executive officers to whom Congress has confided
the power of decision.17
16. In the 90th Congress, of the 7,293 private immigration and nationality
bills introduced, only 218 were enacted into law. In the 93rd Congress, only
63 became law. The statistics may be found in 1974 INS ANN. REP. 132,
table 55.
17. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972); Goon Wing Wah v.
INS, 386 F.2d 292, 294 (lst Cir. 1967). On occasion, a court will suggest
administrative lenity. See United States v. McAllister, 395 F.2d 852 (3d
Cir. 1968). In United States v. Santelises, 509 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1975), the
court pointed out that in less than a year the alien would have the residence
prerequisite to relief under I. & N. Act § 244(a) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (2)(1970). The court added:
In view of the time which has passed since he committed the de-portable offense, we hardly think the Immigration and Natural-ization Service would be remiss in its duty if it were to wait thefew months necessary to afford Santelises an opportunity to apply
pursuant to § 1254. 509 F.2d at 704.
More typical is the attitude expressed in Dunn v. INS, No. 72-2186, (9thCir. February 20, 1974) (unreported), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 919 (1974):
While this is a case in which the administrative discretion vestedin the Immigration and Naturalization Service might have been
exercised with greater compassion, the scope of our review in this
area is extremely narrow. We may suspend a deportation order
only if the decision of the Immigration Service is without "reason-
able foundation."
The facts of that case as spelled out in the opinion of Justices Stewart and
Douglas, dissenting from the denial of certiorari, made out a sympathetic
case for the favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 419 U.S. at 919-
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It is in the face of these practical considerations that the exer-
cise of administrative discretion must be examined.
PROSECUTORIAL DIscmRIoN
The question whether to bring a proceeding against an alien (or
a citizen),18 when to proceed, and under what circumstances, is
frequently presented to Service personnel at all levels.19 A few
examples will suffice.
Foreign students are admitted to the United States as nonimmi-
grants for a limited period to pursue a full course of study at a
designated educational institution approved by the Attorney Gen-
eral.20 They are supposed to have the wherewithal to complete
their studies without the need for outside paid employment, but
the Service may permit part-time employment based on unforeseen
circumstances arising subsequent to entry.2 1 A foreign student
who takes up unauthorized employment thereby violates his stu-
24. See also Oliver v. INS, 517 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1975) where the
court stated:
This is a case illustrating that, once the machinery of the law
has been set in motion, administrative and judicial authorities may
be powerless to stop it, however much they wish. Perhaps peti-
tioner can obtain relief from another branch of the Government;
to our regret we cannot grant it to her.
18. Although the immigration laws are usually thought of as affecting
only aliens, United States citizens may also be directly involved. Thus, for
example, a citizen may file a petition which, if approved by the Service,
will confer priority in the issuance of an immigrant visa to a closely related
alien. See notes 8 & 9 supra and I. & N. Act § 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (1970).
For "good and sufficient cause," the Service can proceed against a citizen
to revoke the approval of his previously approved visa petition. I. & N.
Act § 205, 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (1970); 8 C.F.R. § 205 (1975).
19. The tendency in the Service through the years has been to decen-
tralize the power to start proceedings to the lowest responsible level in the
field. When I entered the Service in 1941, deportation proceedings were
started by the issuance of an administrative warrant of arrest. The sup-
porting evidence needed to make out a prima facie case of deportability was
assembled in the field office and sent through the District Director to the
Central Office in Washington, D.C., together with an application for the is-
suance of a warrant of arrest. Only the Chief of the Warrant Branch in
the Central Office could authorize the warrant of arrest. Today, deporta-
tion proceedings are started by orders to show cause, which can be issued
by District Directors, Acting District Directors, Deputy District Directors,
Assistant District Directors for Investigations, and certain officers in charge
of suboffices. 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(a) (1975).
20. I. &N. Act § 101(a) (15) (F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (15) (F) (1970).
21. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f) (6) (1975).
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dent status and renders himself liable to deportation if he fails to
leave the country. Since many foreign students manage to come
here only through tremendous personal privation and sacrifices on
the part of their parents and friends, such enforced departure be-
fore completion of the projected educational program here can be
monetarily wasteful and emotionally destructive. Where such a
violation of status was unwitting or brief, some Service officers may
tend to overlook it and permit the alien to continue his student
status unimpaired. Others may take a more serious view of the
infraction and promptly start proceedings to compel the alien's de-
parture.
Some aliens who are clearly deportable are not proceeded against
where the Service concludes that adverse action would be uncon-
scionable because of appealing humanitarian factors. The deport-
able alien may be infirm with age or a child of tender years. He
may be an adult who came here as a baby, whose entire family
resides here, and who would suffer extraordinary hardship if sepa-
rated from his loved ones and forced to return to a country where
he would be literally a stranger. In the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, cases which the Service considers appropriate2 2 are
placed in a "nonpriority" category and action to compel the illegal
alien's departure is indefinitely deferred.
In some situations, aliens who are deportable as overstayed non-
immigrant visitors can be granted permission by the Service to de-
part voluntarily without the issuance of an order to show cause in
deportation proceedings, 28 and for the beneficiaries of approved
visa petitions the departure date can be periodically extended until
an immigrant visa becomes available. This may be done in the case
of an Eastern Hemisphere native with a permanent resident spouse
in the United States, since visa availability will pave the way for
eligibility to discretionary adjustment of his status to that of a per-
manent resident without the need for leaving the United States.2"
In the case of a Western Hemisphere native who under current law
gains no benefit priority-wise from his marriage to a permanent
22. That considerations of public relations may sometime underlie the
Service inaction does not necessarily detract from the worthiness of the pro-
gram. As one District Director candidly put it: "Any factor if exposed to
public view, which would be seized upon by the sob-sisters of the daily
press to paint us as inhumane, would probably get this kind of considera-
tion." SixTH ANNuAL In GRATrON AND NATURALIZATION INSTTUTE 141(Practicing Law Institute 1974).
23. I. & N. Act § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1970); 8 C.F.R. § 242.5
(1975).
24. I. & N. Act § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1970).
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resident alien and who is barred by statute from achieving perman-
ent resident status without leaving the United States, 25 the peri-
odic extensions of voluntary departure until an immigrant visa be-
comes available permit him to go abroad and return promptly as
an immigrant with the least possible disruption of his marriage.
As a matter of policy, the Service extends this indulgence to West-
ern Hemisphere natives only if both the marriage took place and
the residence in the United States began on or before April 10, 1973,
unless the District Director finds there are compelling factors which
warrant an exception.
26
The foregoing are merely a few examples of the many instances
in which the Service is called upon to exercise prosecutorial dis-
cretion. What is noteworthy is that the discretion is exercised by
enforcement officials in the performance of their prosecutorial
functions. It goes without saying that the determination to proceed
against one deportable alien and not another may possibly be based
on discriminations of the sort generally considered impermissible,
e.g., political motivations or racial or religious prejudice. Yet, those
who adjudicate the deportation cases (the Immigration Judges and
the Board) confine themselves to the narrow question whether the
record sustains the charge of deportability and refuse to review the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.27
The courts also do not review the exercise of prosecutorial dis-
cretion, except for abuse.28 One court recently justified a judicial
interest in reviewing selective prosecution allegedly based on im-
permissible discriminations and granted discovery to ascertain the
actual basis on which the Service has elected to proceed.29
25. Id. § 245 (c), 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (c).
26. See generally 2 C. GORDoN & H. ROsENvIELD, ImMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 7.2a (rev. ed. 1975); id. § 5.3e(4). The present policy is set
forth in the Service's internal Operations Instructions, 01 242.10 (a), as re-
vised August 8, 1973.
27. "Our function is not to review the District Director's judgment in in-
stituting deportation proceedings, but to determine whether the deportation
charge is sustained by the requisite evidence." In re Lennon, 15 I. &. N.
Dec. , - (I.D. 2304 1974). See also In re Merced, 14 I. & N. Dec. -
(I.D. 2273 1974), aff'd per curiam, 514 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1975); In re
Anaya, 14 I. & N. Dec. - (I.D. 2243 1973), affd per curiam, 500 F.2d 574
(5th Cir. 1974).
28. United States v. Sacco, 428 F.2d 264, 271 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 903 (1970).
29. Lennon v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The court
The standards by which prosecutorial discretion is exercised and
the procedures for invoking this bounty have not been announced
generally.30 With respect to the possibility of obtaining a "non-
priority" classification, one District Director had the following to
say:
I suggest that the attorney might go up front and see the District
Director. The District Director does not have the sole authority to
classify a case as a non-priority. A kind of biographical history
of the case, a dossier, so to speak is prepared by the officer handl-
ing the case and submitted through supervisory channels to the
District Director. If there is agreement all along the line, the Dis-
trict Director gets it, and, if he agrees with it, he can countersign
the form. Then it goes to our regional office where the regional
commissioner considers it. He agrees; he signs it. Then it goes to
the central office where there is a non-priority committee. If they
approve it, then it becomes an accomplished fact. The alien is
notified that no action will be taken to enforce his departure. That
is a comparatively new feature. Until about a year ago, we were
not advising the individuals so affected.81
Since the potential beneficiary of the favorable exercise of prose-
cutorial discretion has so much at stake, common fairness would
seem to require that the standards and procedures be articulated
and published, so that all those affected may know in advance what
considerations are relevant and how the pertinent proof should be
channeled.
THE APPRAISAL OF EVIDENCE
In numerous Service proceedings, applicants for specified benefits
under the immigration laws have the burden of proving that they
meet the statutory requirements. 32  Whether the issue arises in
stated:
Defendants argue that the decision to institute immigration pro-
ceedings on the basis of a non-priority classification or for any
other reason is a matter that rests entirely in the discretion of the
District Director and is unreviewable in any Court or administra-
tive proceeding. As I view it, these cases hold no more than that
the District Court lacks jurisdiction to review the judgment of the
District Director in a bona. fide exercise of his discretion in decid-
ing to institute a deportation proceeding even if he acted arbi-
trarily, capriciously or irrationally in so doing. These cases do not,
and, in my view, could not hold that a government official can with
impunity, immune from judicial review, institute a deportation pro-
ceeding solely as a penalty for the lawful exercise of constitutional
rights. Id. at 564 (emphasis by the court) (citations omitted).
30. For a good discussion of the various types of negative discretion ex-
ercised by the Service and the manner of their exercise, see 1 C. GORDON
& H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 5-23 to 5-26.5 (rev.
ed. 1975).
31. SIXTH ANNUAL IMIIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION INSTITUTE, supra
note 22, at 141.
32. See, e.g., In re Brantigan, 11 I. & N. Dec. 493, 495 (1966); 8 C.F.R.
§ 242.17(d) (1975).
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a formal proceeding, such as a deportation hearing before an Immi-
gration Judge, or in an application adjudicated by a District Direc-
tor without a trial-type hearing, such as a visa petition, the appli-
cant must present evidence to establish the existence of the facts
on which his claimed eligibility rests. Frequently, the facts can
be proved virtually beyond question by official records, such as
birth certificates, marriage certificates, and the like. Often, how-
ever, all that may be available is proof of a less reliable nature,
or discrepancies may turn up which are susceptible of conflicting
inferences. In some instances, the ultimate fact finding made by
the adjudicator may be influenced by subjective considerations,
based on his own personal attitudes and negative experiences.
In many types of applications, eligibility depends on the existence
of a close family relationship to a United States citizen or perman-
ent resident alien. Where the claimed relationship originated in
a foreign country, which is frequently the case, it may be difficult
to prove. In many lands, public records of the sort we normally
accept as reliable are deficient or nonexistent. The state of the
pertinent foreign law, which is itself a question of fact that must
be proved like any other, may also be difficult to establish. This
is especially true with respect to developing nations, in some of
which the law depends on unrecorded local or tribal customs. Since
the elimination of the National Origins system of selecting immi-
grants in 1965 and the substitution of what is essentially a "first-
come, first-served" basis,33 there has been a radical change in the
complexion of our new immigrants.34 Once settled in the United
States, many of the immigrants seek to bring over the parents,
wives and children they left behind, and questions of fact involving
marriage, divorce, parentage, legitimacy, adoption, death, and the
33. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911.
34. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965, the last full year before the
1965 amendments took effect, the annual quota for all the Asian countries
was 3,690. That year, 801 natives of China and other Chinese persons were
charged to the quota, and this included 667 already in the United States
who were granted suspension of deportation. In the same year, 95 quota
immigrants from the Philippines were admitted. 43 INTEPRETER RELEAsES
100 (1966). In the year ending June 30, 1974, 130,662 natives of Asia were
admitted as immigrants, including 32,857 from the Philippines; 28,028 from
Korea; 18,056 from China and Taiwan; 12,799 from India. 1974 INS ANN.
REP. 30, table 6.
like are presented.3 5 If an adjudicator sitting in judgment on such
a visa petition happens to feel that the National Origins system
was a better one and that we already have received more immi-
grants of certain nationalities or races than he thinks are good for
our well-being as a nation, this feeling can readily be translated
into a negative decision in a case where the evidence is arguable
or less than conclusive.
A fact finding as to the alien's good faith or intention is fre-
quently necessary. Where benefits are made available on the basis
of marriage to a United States citizen or resident alien, the statute
contemplates a bona fide marital relationship. 36 The rising tide of
sham marriages in immigration cases has been noted by the Ser-
vice37 and has led to closer scrutiny of applications seeking immi-
gration benefits through marriage. In assessing the bona fides of
a given marriage, the adjudicator must frequently take into account
the post-marital conduct of the parties and measure it against his
own notion of how married couples do (or should be expected to)
conduct their lives, surely a subjective standard. In setting aside
an administrative fact finding on such an issue, one court recently
cautioned that "[a]liens cannot be required to have more successful
or more conventional marriages than citizens. 38
35. See, e.g., In re Kwong, 15 I. &. N. Dec. - (I.D. 2387 1975) (mar-
riage-Hong Kong); In re Bhegani 15 I. & N. Dec. - (I.D. 2382 1975)
(adoption-Uganda); In re Duncan, 15 I. & N. Dec, - (I.D. 2373 1975)
(legitimation-Liberia); In re Akinsete, 15 I. & N. Dec. - (I.D. 2369 1975)
(divorce-Nigeria); In re Rungrerng, 15 I. & N. Dec. - (I.D. 2363 1975)
(adoption-Thailand); In re Kong, 15 I. & N. Dec. (I.D. 2360 1975)
(adoption-Burma); In re Lee, 15 I. & N. Dec. - (I.D. 2359 1975) (adop-
tion-Hong Kong); In re Harris, 15 I. & N. Dec. - (I.D. 2308 1970) (legit-
imation-Liberia).
36. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953); United States v. Sacco,
428 F.2d 264, 269 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903 (1970).
37. 1974 INS AnN. REP. 15.
38. Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1975). In that case,
the parties to the marriage had domestic quarrels and had separated from
time to time. One of the factors cited in the Board opinion was a conflict
in their testimony as to how much time they actually spent together. The
Court of Appeals stated:
[T]he concept of establishing a life as marital partners contains no
federal dictate about the kind of life that the partners may choose
to lead. Any attempt to regulate their life styles, such as prescrib-
ing the amount of time they must spend together, or designating
the manner in which either partner elects to spend his or her time,
in the guise of specifying the requirements of a bona fide marriage
would raise serious constitutional questions. Aliens cannot be re-
quired to have more conventional or more successful marriages
than citizens.
Moreover, the determination may have been influenced by the
irrelevant fact, cited by respondent to support the Service, that the
[VOL. 13: 144, 1975] Administrative Discretion
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Good moral character is frequently a statutory eligibility re-
quirement 39 which, like other such requirements, must be found
as fact before discretionary relief may be granted. The statute
enumerates a number of instances in which a finding of good moral
character is precluded.40 In making fact findings on disputed evi-
dence and in reaching the ultimate fact finding on how the alien's
conduct measures up to community standards, the adjudicator can
readily be influenced by subjective factors in his own makeup.
This is especially true with respect to value judgments on issues
of sexual morality, such as adultery, which Congress has seen fit
to enumerate specifically as a bar to a finding of good moral charac-
ter.
41
The question of an alien's intentions at the time of admission as
a nonimmigrant (say, a temporary visitor or student) is often a
crucial one. Many aliens come here by means of the readily acces-
sible nonimmigrant route, a means of entry to which they are in-
eligible and which would be denied them if they revealed an actual
but undisclosed intention to work here or to remain indefinitely. 42
Whether the Service will thereafter exercise prosecutorial discre-
tion favorably in behalf of such an alien or will grant discretionary
relief from deportation will frequently depend upon a fact finding
as to the bona fides of his nonimmigrant entry. In arriving at a
decision on that issue, the adjudicator must often take into account
not only the alien's circumstances abroad (e.g., statements to the
consul in applying for the visa, economic and domestic situation)
but also his post-entry conduct (how soon after entry he undertook
paid employment, divorced his wife abroad, married a United States
citizen, etc.). In making such fact findings, the adjudicator can be
readily influenced by his own subjective attitudes, based on his
experiences in other cases and other nonrecord evidence.43
wife could and did leave as she pleased when they were together.
The bona fides of a marriage do not and cannot rest on either mari-
tal partner's choice about his or her mobility after marriage. Id.(citations omitted).
39. See, e.g., I. & N. Act §§ 244(a), 244(e), 249, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1254(a), 1254(e), 1259 (1970).
40. Id. 9 101(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (f).
41. Id. § 101(f) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2).
42. Such aliens are "immigrants" and hence inadmissible without an im-
migrant visa. Id. §§ 101(a) (15), 212(a) (20), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a) (15), 1182(a) (20).
43. See, e.g., the observation of one of the Immigration Judges in an un-
Where the fact finder clearly sets forth the reasons for his find-
ings, the way is open for the person affected by an adverse finding
to seek further administrative or judicial review if he thinks the
ultimate finding is unsupported or otherwise unwarranted. But
what remedy is there where the real basis for the adverse finding
is the adjudicator's unexpressed (and perhaps unconscious) bias?
DIscRmIoNARY RELIEF
The exercise of administrative discretion in the usual sense of
that phrase is involved in those cases in which the immigration laws
provide a discretionary remedy waiving specified grounds of inad-
rnissibility or deportability or providing for the creation of a record
of lawful admission for permanent residence for an alien without
that status. Since these forms of relief are a matter of grace and
not of right, they are distinguishable from the few statutory dispen-
sations which are cast in absolute terms and which become opera-
tive automatically once the statutory facts are fixed.44
Among the statutory dispensations available as a matter of ad-
ministrative discretion to eligible aliens are waivers of inadmissi-
bility to permanent resident aliens returning from a temporary visit
abroad to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive
years,45 waivers of certain grounds of inadmissibility for certain
nonimmigrant applicants,46 waiver of the two-year foreign resi-
reported case involving a Filipino, In re Salvador, INS file A17207299
(Aug. 30, 1972):
By now, everyone dealing with such matters is aware that aliens
from the Philippines will engage in any fraud to get here and will
do anything to stay. Attorneys have repeatedly informed me that
when they are consulted by aliens who have been told to leave the
United States they inform them that unless they are married to citi-
zens or permanent residents, nothing can be done for them. The
advice given by such attorneys is quite accurate and results in cases
like this.
44. See, e.g., I. & N. Act § 241(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f) (1970), barring de-
portation for fraudulent entry in certain instances. See also id. § 241(b),
8 U.S.C. § 1251(b), barring deportation based on conviction of crime
involving moral turpitude where there has been an executive pardon or ju-
dicial recommendation against deportation. See also id. § 243(h), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(h), in which the Attorney General is "authorized" to withhold
deportation to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be perse-
cuted. As construed in the light of pertinent commitments under the United
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6224, when
the finding of likely persecution is made, withholding of deportation follows.
In re Dunar, 14 I. &. N. Dec. - (I.D. 2192 1973). Similarly, once the statu-
tory elements have been made out, labor certification issuance is not discre-
tionary but required. Secretary of Labor v. Farino, 490 F.2d 885 (7th Cir.
1973).
45. I. & N. Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1970).
46. Id. § 212(d) (3), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d) (3).
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dence requirement for certain exchange visitors, 47 and waiver of
certain grounds of inadmissibility for specified classes of aliens.48
Waivers of this sort are important not only to aliens outside the
United States applying for admission but also to aliens in the
United States seeking a statutory remedy which requires a showing
of admissibility to the United States. 49
In the cases of aliens in the United States unlawfully or other-
wise without permanent residence status, certain discretionary
remedies are available which either convert their status to that of
a permanent resident or pave the way for the acquisition of that
status. Chief among these remedies are suspension of deporta-
tion,"° voluntary departure, 51 adjustment of status to permanent
residence,52 and creation of a record of lawful admission for per-
manent residence. 53
In cases of this sort, the first question ordinarily presented is
whether the pertinent statutory eligibility requirements have been
made out, for unless eligibility is established the power to exercise
discretion may not be invoked.54 Even where eligibility is clear,
however, the administrative adjudicator still has a judgment to
make. In the exercise of discretion, he must either grant the relief
sought or deny it.55 In some instances, the question of eligibility
has been pretermitted altogether and relief has been denied in the
exercise of administrative discretion, without more.56
47. Id. § 212 (e), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (e).
48. Id. §§ 212(g), (h), (i), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(g), (h), (i).
49. See, e.g., id. § 245 (a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (a).
50. Id. § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a).
51. Id. § 244(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e).
52. Id. § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255.
53. Id. § 249, 8 U.S.C. § 1259.
54. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 352 (1956).
55. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72 (1957).
56. Goon Wing Wah v. INS, 386 F.2d 292 (1st Cir. 1967); Silva v. Carter,
326 F.2d 315 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 917 (1964). One court
has recently held in a case involving an alien in the United States that
where the discretionary denial was predicated on a fact finding which could
later lead a consul abroad to reach an unreviewable determination that the
alien is ineligible for a visa, the alien is entitled to an express administra-
tive determination of eligibility, notwithstanding the eligibility-discretion
dichotomy, in order that he might avail himself of administrative and ju-
dicial review of the eligibility determination while still in the United States.
Bagamasbad v. INS, No. 74-1440 (3d Cir. June 9, 1975).
In view of the broad range of the discretionary authority thus
confided to the Attorney General and his delegates,57 some stand-
ards are clearly needed to preclude arbitrary and capricious deci-
sion-making by the many delegates of the Attorney General exer-
cising his discretion. The courts have held that discretion must be
exercised on the individual facts of each case and have forbidden
the prescription by the Attorney General of arbitrary classifications
or lists of specific aliens to whom relief must be denied."' Where
the limitations on the grant of relief as a matter of discretion to
aliens otherwise statutorily eligible have been prescribed by formal
regulation, however, they have been sustained.
The absence of meaningful administrative standards as guides to
adjudicators in the exercise of discretion has been noted and criti-
cized in recent years.60 One judge has suggested that "proper ad-
ministration would be advanced and reviewing courts would be as-
sisted if the Attorney General, or his delegate, without attempting
to be exhaustive in an area inherently insusceptible of such treat-
ment, were to outline certain bases deemed to warrant the affirma-
tive exercise of discretion and other grounds generally militating
against it." 61  The Board has attempted to lay down general
guidelines in its published decisions, but the adjudicators have not
all considered them as satisfactory.6 2
Typical of the problems is the situation presented in a section
245 case, in which statutory eligibility has been successfully estab-
57. In Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 354 (1956), in a suspension of deporta-
tion setting, the Attorney General was said to have "unfettered discretion."
58. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954);
Mastrapasqua v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1950). On April 23,
1954, the Attorney General issued Order No. 45-54, directing all officers in-
volved in decision-making in deportation cases to conduct fair hearings
without prejudgment of the issues.
59. Under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2 (c) (1) (1975), an alien seeking admission in
transit through the United States without a visa is admitted on the condi-
tion, among others, that he will not apply for adjustment of status under
I. & N. Act § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1970). The Board has construed this
provision as a limitation on eligibility for section 245 relief. In re Davis,
10 I. & N. Dec. 441 (1964). This is a holding which the courts have con-
sistently endorsed. Fook Hong Mak v. INS, 435 F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1970).
60. See, e.g., Ameeriar v. INS, 438 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1971); Sofaer, Ju-
dicial Control of Informal Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement, 72
CoLum. L. REv. 1293 passim (1972).
61. This was Judge Friendly in Wong Wing Hang v. INS, 360 F.2d 715,
718 (2d Cir. 1966).
62. In the unpublished opinion of In re California, INS file A 17199904(Mar. 10, 1970), the Immigration Judge had this, among other things, to
say:
The Board, by designating certain of its decisions as precedents,
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lished but where the adjudicator is unsure whether to exercise dis-
cretion favorably. There are many factual variables in the cases.
The applicant may have a clean record but little by way of so-called
"equities"; he may be a newcomer with only brief residence here.
He may have no close family ties here, and may indeed have strong
ties abroad. He may be at a great distance from the consular office
abroad where he would have to apply for a visa if denied section
245 adjustment, so that the denial would entail not only great travel
expenses but also loss of time and possibly loss of his job here.
Since such an alien is already eligible for a visa, what important
institutional purpose is served by denying section 245 relief in the
exercise of discretion and forcing him to obtain his visa abroad?
In the case of an alien whose record is not completely "clean"
or presents factors which the Service considers "adverse," discre-
tionary denial is often justified on the need to preserve the integrity
of the system. Thus, the alien who comes to the United States in
the guise of a nonimmigrant visitor, knowing that he can establish
visa eligibility promptly after arrival and intending to do so as a
predicate for section 245 adjustment, circumvents the consular visa-
issuing process. Discretionary denial in such a case can be realistic-
ally justified as discouraging such an abuse and restoring the alien
to the position abroad that he would have had if he had dealt in
good faith with the consul.
Other factors may underlie the alien's desire to come to the
United States through the relatively easy nonimmigrant route. He
may have an unbearable marriage in a country which does not per-
mit divorce, and may desire to get a "quickie" divorce here. Or
he may come here in good faith as a nonimmigrant visitor or stu-
dent and change his mind and decide to stay here permanently only
after admission, because he has been persuaded by relatives he
sets standards with regard to the granting or denying of applica-
tions under section 245 as a matter of discretion. I have been with
the Immigration Service for 35 years, 15 as a hearing officer. It
has been said that I am very astute and competent. Yet, notwith-
standing my experience, astuteness, and competence, I must confess
that no matter how conscientiously I attempt to follow the guide-
lines set by the precedent decisions of the Board with regard to
the exercise of discretion, I haven't the slightest idea whether my
decision will be sustained or reversed. I have discussed this with
a number of my colleagues and I also find it true with them. In-
deed, I can safely say that this is the single most frustrating aspect
of the work of [an Immigration Judge] ....
visits here, or has fallen in love with a United States citizen or
resident alien he has met here. He may come here as a nonimmi-
grant in good faith, with a qualified intention to remain here only
if permitted to do so by law.63
There are numerous other variables. The alien may have left
behind in the old country his wife and children, whom he continues
to support and whom he intends to bring over as soon as he can.
He may have deserted his wife and children and failed to support
them. He may have temporarily taken up with another woman
here, pending such time as his wife can join him. The other woman
may have become pregnant, and he may have divorced his wife
abroad and married the girl here in order to legitimatize their
American-born offspring.
The Board has recognized the imperative of even-handed justice
and through the years has laid down general guidelines, while ac-
knowledging the need for individual adjudication. 4 The standards
have varied from time to time and have not been too consistent. A
few references to its reported decisions will suffice to illustrate the
problems.
In In re Barrios,65 a native of Bolivia, who under the then-exist-
Ing law could have applied for an immigrant visa without regard
to numerical limitations, entered as a nonimmigrant visitor after
he failed to qualify for an immigrant visa because he could not
furnish an affidavit of support. In subsequent proceedings for sec-
tion 245 adjustment, he testified that when he was admitted he in-
tended to visit some factories and visit some relatives, but not to
change to a resident; that at entry he contemplated the possibility
of applying for permanent residence if legally permitted to do so,
but did not actually make the decision to change status until after
entry, when he saw that he would have the opportunity to work
and study at the same time. The Board held that this combination
of factors did not spell out a case of circumventing the immigration
laws and that relief was warranted in the exercise of discretion.
In In re Diaz-Villamil,66 a Colombian native who had entered
63. Brownell v. Carija, 254 F.2d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
64. See In re M-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 626, 627 (1952):
We wish to caution that what we say here is not to be taken
as an invariable rule, but that in each case the decision ultimately
must be predicated upon the merits or demerits of that case. Nev-
ertheless, when considering discretionary action, it is of the greatest
importance in striving for justice and impartiality that all aliens
whose cases are substantially similar receive like treatment.
65. 10 I. & N. Dec. 172 (1963).
66. 10 I. & N. Dec. 494 (1964).
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as a nonimmigrant visitor gave conflicting and evasive testimony
in his section 245 application as to his intentions at entry. The
Immigration Judge concluded he had a preconceived intention to
adjust to a permanent resident after entry and denied the applica-
tion as a matter of discretion. The Board agreed, stating that "[t] o
hold otherwise would be an invitation for nonquota and open quota
intending immigrants to render useless the legally designated visa
issuing functions of United States consuls abroad."0 7  This ra-
tionale was followed in In re Garcia-Castillo,68 involving a native
of Peru, then a nonquota country, who had entered with the pro-
scribed preconceived intention.
In later decisions, the Board concluded that where such a precon-
ceived intent is present, section 245 adjustment should be denied
in the exercise of discretion in the absence of "substantial equities."
In In re Rubio-Vargas,69 a permanent resident alien wife in the
United States, whom the applicant had married in Peru and whom
he came here to join in the guise of a visitor, was not considered
a substantial equity sufficient to warrant discretionary relief.
A new dimension was added in In re Ortiz-Prieto,70 involving
a native of Chile who was clearly eligible for section 245 adjustment
and whose good faith entry as a nonimmigrant was incontrovertibly
established. Noting that he had no close family ties or dependents
living in the United States and that he had a wife and three chil-
dren living in Chile, the Board concluded that discretionary denial
was warranted because there were no "outstanding equities" in his
case. Thus, in addition to eligibility, special equities were required
as a condition of the discretionary grant, regardless of whether
there had been a preconceived intent at entry.
Even after the 1965 legislation removed the exemption of Western
Hemisphere countries from quota limitations, the same principles
were applied and even made more restrictive. In In re Leger,71
the Board stated that, "[t]here must be outstanding equities, in a
generally meritorious case, to warrant [the grant of adjustment]."
67. Id. at 496.
68. 10 I. & N. Dec. 516 (1964).
69. 11 L & N. Dec. 167 (1965).
70. 11 . & N. Dec. 317 (1965).
71. 11 I. & N. Dec. 796, 797 (1966).
In In re Ramirez,72 the discretionary denial of adjustment to an
eligible alien from El Salvador was sustained on the following ra-
tionale: "This Board has consistently held that the extraordinary
discretionary relief provided for in [section 245] should only be
granted in meritorious cases .... On the basis of the factors here-
inbefore recited, we find that there are no outstanding equities cry-
ing out for favorable action on the application."73
Since section 245 adjustment merely grants permanent resident
status to an alien already eligible for that status, one may wonder
why it should be considered "extraordinary". Suspension of de-
portation under section 244(a) of the Act 74 may be thought of
as extraordinary since it confers lawful permanent residence on a
deportable alien. Registry under section 249 of the Act 7 5 may
be deemed extraordinary since it authorizes the creation of a record
of lawful admission for permanent residence where none existed
before. In the case of a section 245 applicant, however, the alien
must establish not only that he is eligible for admission and for
an immigrant visa, but also that such a visa is immediately avail-
able to him. It is true that if discretion is favorably exercised in
his behalf, the cost of round-trip transportation abroad, the wait-
ing time abroad, and separation from his family and employment
are obviated. However, he gains no status which would not
otherwise be his under the law.7 6 I fail to see what governmen-
tal interest is served by forcing such an eligible alien to leave
the United States even temporarily, absent some overriding con-
siderations.
In In re Arai,77 the Board found it desirable to restate its stand-
ards. The case involved a 27-year-old single male who had entered in
good faith as a nonimmigrant visitor, who was concededly eligible
for section 245 adjustment, and whose background reflected no ad-
verse factors. The Immigration Judge had nevertheless denied re-
lief in the exercise of discretion on the basis of In re Ortiz-Prieto,
72. 12 I. & N. Dec. 78 (1967).
73. Id. at 80.
74. I. & N. Act § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1970).
75. Id. § 249, 8 U.S.C. § 1259.
76. There are two other possible disadvantages to an eligible alien who
is nevertheless required to go abroad to apply for his immigrant visa. First,
the American consul abroad may arbitrarily refuse to issue the visa, and
such a decision is not subject to judicial review. 'Brownell v. Tom We
Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 184, n.3 (1956); Loza-Bedoya v. INS, 410 F.2d 343 (9th
Cir. 1969). Second, his home country may seize him for military service,
if due.
77. 13 L & N. Dec. 494 (1970).
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since there were no "outstanding equities" to make the case "meri-
torious." The Board stated:
We are now of the opinion that the language set forth in Matter
of Ortiz-Prieto, supra, should be clarified and modified because it
is too broad in its impact and probably more demanding than
necessary. Accordingly, the language of the instant decision will
supersede that contained in Ortiz-Prieto.
It is difficult and probably inadvisable to set up restrictive guide
lines for the exercise of discretion. Problems which may arise in
applications for adjustment must of necessity be resolved on an
individual basis. Where adverse factors are present in a given ap-
plication, it may be necessary for the applicant to offset these by
a showing of unusual or even outstanding equities. Generally,
favorable factors such as family ties, hardship, length of residence
in the United States, etc., will be considered as countervailing
factors meriting favorable exercise of administrative discretion. In
the absence of adverse factors, adjustment will ordinarily be
granted, still as a matter of discretion.78
While this formulation represented an improvement insofar as it
furnished more detailed examples of the decisive factors, rather
than merely referring only to such nebulous criteria as "meritori-
ous" and "oustanding equities," it left many questions unanswered.
How much weight should be accorded to each of the favorable fac-
tors enumerated, i.e., family ties in the United States, hardship,
length of residence here? In addition to the type of preconceived
intent generally considered an "adverse factor," what other types
of conduct should be considered adverse? Suppose the alien had
taken up employment without Service permission? Suppose he had
failed to reveal that employment when applying to the Service for
an extension of stay? Suppose the family ties had been created
in the United States rather than abroad, i.e., the alien had married
a United States citizen or permanent resident alien while still in
lawful status? Suppose he had married her after his lawful non-
immigrant status here had terminated? Suppose his relationship
with her had started while he was still in legal status and marriage
had to be deferred until after he or she had obtained a legal ter-
mination of a prior marriage? If the break-up of a foreign marriage
is to be considered a relevant factor, isn't it equally relevant to
determine who was responsible for the break-up? Where the alien
had obtained a divorce while here from his wife in the old country
78. Id. at 495-96.
and had remarried here to a citizen or permanent resident alien,
what effect should be given to the fact that his enforced departure,
while breaking up his marriage here and possibly forcing his Ameri-
can wife and child to go on relief, would not in any event restore
him to his family abroad?
The situation has been further confused by the Board's turnabout
adherence to its pre-Arai generalized formulations. By a divided
vote, the Board on August 2, 1974, stated in an opinion designated
for publication as a precedent:
Adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act was not designed
to supersede the regular consular visa-issuing processes or to be
granted in non-meritorious cases .... An applicant who meets
the objective prerequisites for adjustment of status is in no way en-
titled to that relief .... That relief is extraordinary inasmuch
as it dispenses with ordinary immigration procedures .... We
therefore held in Matter of Ortiz-Prieto, supra, and affirm, that the
extraordinary discretionary relief provided in section 245 of the
Act can only be granted in meritorious cases, and that the burden
is always upon the alien to establish that his application for that
relief merits favorable consideration ....
In Matter of Arai, supra, at page 495, we had stated the follow-
ing: "In the absence of adverse factors, adjustment will ordinarily
be granted, still as a matter of discretion." That statement should
not be misinterpreted as implying that adjustment of status must
be granted in the absence of major adverse factors, or that the
Service has the burden of showing that the alien is not entitled to
adjustment of status. Adjustment of status pursuant to section 245
of the Immigration and Nationality Act may be granted where the
alien has established that favorable exercise of discretion is war-
ranted.79
I fail to see how his negative and retrogressive approach clarifies
anything except the adjudicator's license to function without the
restraining influence of meaningful standards.
It should be possible to achieve greater uniformity of decision,
while at the same time minimizing the opportunities for result-
oriented adjudication based on an adjudicator's subjective feelings,
by defining with greater precision not only the policies to be served
but also the elements to be considered. It does not matter whether
the guiding principles are laid down in published regulations or in
the Board's published precedent decisions, which are binding on the
Service. 0 Certainly, greater care should be taken in thinking
through and then defining those elements which should be con-
79. In re Blas, INS file A 18437421 (Aug. 2, 1974) (citations omitted).
The Board's decision has been certified to the Attorney General for review,
8 CYF.R. § 3.1(h) (ii) (1975), and is now pending before the Attorney Gen-
eral.
80. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (g) (1975).
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sidered "adverse" and those which can be properly juxtaposed in
mitigation. Greater precisiveness need not completely straitjacket
the adjudicator or limit the range of elements which may properly
be considered.
Of course, even with more precise definition of the relevant fac-
tors, the adjudicator must still determine how much weight to as-
sign to each of the competing elements and in this appraisal his
subjective notions can still come into play. It is at this point that
clear policy statements become of overriding importance as a guide
to action.
Uniformity of decision with mathematical precision is, of course,
possible. Specific point values could be prescribed for each element
deemed relevant, e.g., so many minus points for a preconceived in-
tent, so many for a wife abroad, so many for each minor child
abroad, so many for being responsible for the break-up of the for-
eign marriage, so many for each intentional misstatement to the
Service, etc. Plus points could be assigned for an American citizen
or permanent resident wife, for each American child, for each year
of the alien's residence here, and the like. An appropriate plus
score could be fixed as a prerequisite to the favorable exercise of
discretion. Positive accuracy could be achieved by feeding the data
into a computer and simply pressing a button for the right answer!
Any notion of such mechanical jurisprudence would, of course,
be summarily rejected if seriously suggested. Yet, unless more re-
alistic and specific guidelines are laid down, the opposite extreme
becomes possible if it is left to each individual adjudicator to de-
termine for himself, on the basis of his own subjective experiences
and beliefs, just what factors in the alien's life should be determina-
tive in exercising discretion and how much weight should be ac-
corded each factor. An intolerant adjudicator could deny relief to
aliens whose cultural patterns, political views, moral standards or
life styles differed from his own. Worse still, a hostile or xenophobic
adjudicator could vent his spleen on aliens he personally considered
offensive without articulating the actual basis for his decision.
Unless standards are laid down which are not illusory and can
be uniformly applied in the real world, we depart from even-
handed justice and the rule of law. The computer, at least, is im-
personal!
